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ÖZET 
Uluslararası tahkim bir uluslararası hukuk kavramıdır. Uluslararası tah-
kim, uluslararası hukukun parçalı yapısına uygun düşer. Öte yandan, ulusla-
rarası tahkim gayrıresmi uluslararası hukukun bir yansımasıdır. Bu bakım-
dan uluslararası hukukun tanıma kuralları için bir sorun teşkil eder. Buna 
rağmen uluslararası tahkimin uluslararası hukuka katkısı yadsınamaz. Ulus-
lararası tahkim uluslararası hukukun doğal bir parçasıdır ve uluslararası hu-
kuku zenginleştirir. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Uluslararası tahkim, uluslararası hukuk, uluslara-
rası hukukun parçalanması, gayrıresmi uluslararası hukuk, ticari tahkim, 
yatırım tahkimi, lex mercatoriaa 
ABSTRACT 
International arbitration is a concept of international law. It endorses the 
fragmentary nature of international law and, as a reflection of informal 
international law-making, represents a challenge in terms of rules of 
recognition. Yet, none of these characteristics can be invoked to deny the 
contribution of international arbitration to international law. International 
arbitration is an institution inherent to international law, and one that both 
enhances and enriches international law. 
Keywords: International arbitration, international law, fragmentation 
of international law, informal international law, commercial arbitration, 
investment arbitration, lex mercatoria 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This article examines the concept of international arbitration in terms of 
international law. International arbitration is a distinctive type of 
adjudication, whereby disputing parties have their disputes settled by private 
persons – namely, arbitrators. It is a method whereby a tribunal is 
established by the agreement of the parties and is under their control. 
International arbitration is an alternative to national courts and permanent 
international courts. 
International arbitration shall be viewed in this paper as a universal 
concept, regardless of what the subject (public international law or private 
international law) or the parties (governments, businesses, international 
organizations and/or private individuals) to the arbitration may be. 
Although the paper also refers to a specific type of arbitration (investment 
arbitration) in certain parts, these references ultimately bolster the central 
argument of this article, which is that international arbitration should be 
understood and evaluated as a concept and institution1 inherent and intrinsic 
to international law. 
Following on from this premise, the second section explores the 
fragmentation of international law, after which the third section discusses the 
concept of informal international lawmaking. The fourth section examines 
rules of recognition, a necessary element for legal security, whilst the fifth 
then examines the contribution international arbitration has made to the 
overall body of international law. The sixth section looks at general 
principles of public international law and principles of international 
commerce (lex mercatoria). The paper then concludes by highlighting the 
place of international arbitration within the framework of international law. 
                                                 
1  An interesting definition of the term “institution” could be found in Francis Fukuyama, 
Political Order and Political Decay, Profile Books, London, UK, 2014, p.543: 
Institutions are rules that persist beyond the lifetimes of the individuals who created them. 
They persist partly because they are useful and partly because they are believed to have 
intrinsic value. The human propensity to invest rules with emotional meaning is what 
makes them stable over long periods of time, but their rigidity becomes a liability when 
circumstances change. 
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2. FRAGMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
One of the most significant issues currently being debated within 
international law is the alleged division of international law into many 
sections and the lack of coordination (or the weakness of the coordination) 
among these divergent components. Some examples for these fragmented 
components are international human rights law, international investment 
law, international trade law, international maritime commerce law, 
international criminal law, European Union law and international 
competition law. It is arguably true that different sections of international 
law are not integrated and that international law is indeed fragmented.2 
Indeed, the fragmentation of international law has become a subject of a 
study undertaken by the United Nations International Law Commission, in 
which it was argued that this fragmentation might pose taxing questions and 
obstacles with regard to the coherence of international law.3 
For instance, the protection of investment as conceived in international 
investment law4 has certain parallels with the protection of the right to 
property as envisaged by the European Convention on Human Rights.5 
However, the objective of international investment law (and international 
investment arbitration) is not to protect human rights as such; the ICSID 
(International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes) Convention6 – 
the most important convention on international investment – arbitrates over 
investment disputes and does not regulate human rights.7 Although 
investment law and human rights law intersect, there is still no will to 
reconcile them.8 Indeed, international investment arbitral tribunals have yet 
                                                 
2  David Caron, ICSID in the Twenty-First Century: An Interview with Meg Kinnear, 
Introductory Remarks, American Society of International Law Proceedings, 2010, p.425.  
3  Accessible at http://legal.un.org/ilc/summaries/1_9.htm, (accessed on 31.12.2014) 
4  See, e.g., the preamble of the ICSID Convention (Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States), accessible at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf (accessed 
on 03.03.2015) 
5  European Convention on Human Rights, Protocol 1, Article 1, accessible at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/009.htm, (accessed on 03.03.2015)  
6  Accessible at https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/icsiddocs/Pages/ICSID-
Convention.aspx, (accessed on 20.04.2015)  
7  David Caron, p.424.  
8  Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Rule of Law and Constitutional Justice in 
International Investment Law and Arbitration, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 
MÜHF – HAD, C. 20, S. 3 
 
30 
to subject the concept of “fair and equitable treatment of foreign investment” 
to the criteria of human rights.9 
Fragmentation of international law could be considered a corollary of 
globalization and its attendant complexities, or, alternately; it may be viewed 
as a result of a policy pursued by powerful countries. In terms of the latter 
notion, a fragmented international law would be in the interest of more 
powerful states. This fragmentary nature has a contextual and historical 
dimension: international law has not prevented mass atrocities, global 
economic imbalances or injustices. Following the Second World War, 
international law lost its prestige and was – and to a great extent still is – seen 
as unreliable and impracticable.10 This in turn led the great powers to formally 
recognize the existence of international law, yet at the same time, the same 
powers did little to alter its fragmentary form and structure. Maintaining this 
fragmented structure has worked in favor of the great powers in that when the 
need has been felt for corrections, regulations or modifications to be made to 
some “impracticalities” or anomalies of international law, these changes can 
be speedily and effectively implemented by a process that can be labeled as 
‘reform’ or by simply isolating and/or removing the ‘fragment’ of 
international law in question,11 a process far easier than attempting to ‘correct’, 
reform or abolish the whole of international law as such. 
                                                                                                                   
vol.16, issue 2, Summer 2009, p.524. Benedict Kingsbury, The International Legal Order, 
International Law and Justice Working Papers, 2003/1, New York University School of 
Law, p.11: “ The proliferation of tribunals carries a prospect of fragmentation of 
international law, with different courts reaching conflicting interpretations, and no 
hierarchical mechanism of judicial control.”  
9  Campbell McLachlan QC, Investment Treaties and General International Law, 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol.57, issue 02, April 2008, p.396.  
10  Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace, The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of 
the United Nations, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 2008, p.122-123: 
“The late 1930s represented a moment of deep crisis for what remained of the Victorian 
concept of international – meaning European-based – civilization, especially for those 
professional jurists who had for the past half century seen international law as the key 
instrument for promoting its value and moving toward a world that could rise above petty 
political differences.” p.150: “... the UN, even more than the League (of Nations), was to 
be run by the great powers and far less confidence was reposed in international law as a 
set of norms independent from, and standing above, power politics. On the contrary, as a 
Soviet lawyer wrote, international law now implicitly recognized “special rights” (and 
special obligations) for the great peace-loving states.  
11  Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy and 
the Fragmentation of International Law, Stanford Law Review, vol.60, no.2, november 
2007, p.597-598.  
Yrd. Doç. Dr. Halil Rahman Başaran 
International Arbitration and International Law 
31 
Indeed, after World War II, when the United Nations was being founded, 
a hierarchical order consisting of international institutions under a single roof 
and the auspices of the United Nations was discarded in favor of the 
establishment of certain international institutions with only nominal and 
tenuous links to the United Nations. For instance, specialized agencies such 
as the International Monetary Fund, the International Labour Organization 
and the Universal Postal Union do not have strong links with the United 
Nations, nor does the United Nation’s Economic and Social Council have the 
competence (or, arguably, the wherewithal) to coordinate these institutions.12 
One of the reasons for the deliberate fragmentation of international law 
is to prevent the emergence of a strong international bureaucracy and 
judiciary,13 which would, in the eyes of the more powerful states, reduce their 
freedom of maneuver. In the event, however unlikely, of a strong bureaucracy 
and/or judiciary emerging, further fragmentation could conceivably be 
initiated by advanced countries to undermine that bureaucracy or judiciary. 
Rather than a global and all-encompassing treaty and a permanent 
compulsory dispute settlement mechanism, bilateral treaties and temporary 
dispute settlement mechanisms are favored by the great powers as a means 
of checking international law.14 Moreover, the lack of a binding precedent in 
these dispute settlement mechanisms grants even more discretion to the 
developed countries, who would clearly prefer to stage and pursue bilateral 
interactions with weaker states rather than operate under the supervision of a 
strong international bureaucracy and judiciary that follows and deigns to 
enforce binding precedents. 
Powerful countries, for instance, would not favor a global investment 
treaty or a strong global investment institution. They would prefer bilateral 
treaties worded in general (and sometimes ambiguous) terms and, in the case 
of conflict, would opt for a temporary tribunal to adjudicate. Indeed, at 
present, there exist more than 3000 bilateral investment treaties, and 
although the terms, concepts and language employed by these treaties are 
strikingly similar, a global investment treaty encompassing all these 
comparable bilateral investment treaties has yet to be concluded. Thus, every 
bilateral investment treaty is deemed independent of and different from any 
                                                 
12  Ibid., p.598 
13  Ibid., p.599.  
14  Ibid., p.609.  
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and all other bilateral investment treaties. In the event, therefore, of a 
dispute, a new and “temporary” international arbitral tribunal – focused on 
the specific investment dispute – is established. Every investment treaty and 
every arbitral tribunal is therefore considered idiosyncratic, a symptom and 
an outcome of a fragmented international investment law structure. This 
fragmentation, arguably, is the consequence of policies pursued by advanced 
countries. 
Besides, for powerful countries, blaming current international law is an 
opportune pretext. Powerful countries, which withdraw from a certain 
fragment of international law, could invoke this same fragmentation of 
international law as evidence of its inadequacy, which would lessen the blow 
of leaving an international organization and/or reneging on a legal 
arrangement. It is this freedom of manoeuvre that can give powerful states 
the opportunity to manipulate international law for their own ends. 
Advanced countries may invoke some other arguments in pursuing 
those policies that serve their interests. One argument states that the present 
fragmentation is a concession – of sorts – made for the sake of unity and 
coherence in future international investment law. Due to the current 
incapability of the international community to establish a centralized, 
hierarchical and harmonious international investment law on a global scale, 
this current fragmented situation is deemed better than no regulation at all. 
In this respect, international arbitration – currently in vogue – should be 
seen as a mechanism that takes into consideration powerful states’ interests 
and the asymmetrical leverage that they enjoy. International arbitration finds 
its place in this fragmentary international law, as conceived of by advanced 
countries. For instance, government-to-government arbitration in the field of 
public international law does not have a rule of binding precedent, testimony 
to the fragmentary structure of international law. Thanks to this fragmentary 
and atomistic structure of international arbitration, advanced countries prefer 
international arbitration as a dispute settlement method. 
Nevertheless, is it really plausible to attribute much influence and role 
to powerful countries in the formation of global institutions? Is putting 
forward the interests and agendas of advanced countries as an explanation 
for the current state of international arbitration plausible? Indeed, this 
fragmentary state of international law may be seen not as a situation 
concocted and implemented by certain great powers but as a corollary of the 
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competition and conflict among various forms of expertise within 
international law. International politics and economics are complex and not 
amenable to a centralized and hierarchical regulation, all of which are 
symptomatic of globalization. In this “horizontal” order, different expert 
groups invoke different terminologies, concepts and practices. In most fields 
of international law, there are numerous idiosyncratic expertises, 
international arbitration expertise being one of them, and there is no genuine 
coordination among these various bodies of expertise. 
Although, arguably, advanced countries manipulate and exacerbate this 
fragmentation, the real problem is structural: the international community 
still does not feel prepared for the elimination of this fragmentation, a 
fragmentation of international law that is still compatible with the current 
international system – namely, the globalized political and economic order. 
The focus on powerful countries – without having due regard for the history 
and the structure of the international system – is a narrow conceptualization 
that exacerbates uncertainty. 
Actually, “this uncertainty and the related disorder can be diminished 
by the artifice of creating a higher and broader general concept to represent 
reality.”15 That is, a more general look at the picture of international law is 
essential. In this respect, the League of Nations (1920-1946), the predecessor 
of the United Nations, can be of demonstrative note. The League of Nations 
was an international organization that aimed to promote and ensure 
international peace and security after World War I. However, the League 
represented an abortive attempt, the primary evidence thereof being the fact 
of the outbreak of World War II and the subsequent dissolution of the 
League in 1946. 
Although there are various reasons that may be posited to explain the 
failure of the League of Nations experiment, the primary reason can be said 
to be the lack of participation (or the weakness of the participation) by the 
great powers in the League of Nations. The United States, for one, did not 
become a member of the League and the Soviet Union was initially excluded 
before being accepted as a member. However, this membership was not to 
last long as the USSR was subsequently expelled due to its occupation of 
                                                 
15  John R. Boyd, Destruction and Creation, 3 September 1976, p.6. Accessible at 
http://www.goalsys.com/books/documents/DESTRUCTION_AND_CREATION.pdf, 
(accessed on 03.03.2015)  
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Finland. Nor could the League constrain Germany, Japan or Italy before and 
during World War II and all three eventually left the League. Vis-à-vis the 
‘powerful’ countries of that period, the League lost any power and 
credibility it may have had and it is arguably the participation and the 
approval of powerful countries that make international institutions (and 
international law) both sustainable and effective. 
All in all, in the post-World War II period, it can be safely surmised that 
the powerful countries have had two strategies. The first is to opt for a 
fragmentary structure that can be controlled, a strategy that is securable 
through the lack of, respectively, hierarchy, obligatory universal 
adjudication, a persuasive and forceful bureaucracy and a mechanism of 
binding precedent. The second strategy is to establish and conduct relations, 
as far as possible, upon a bilateral basis and avoid multilaterally binding (and 
therefore effective) arrangements. When the establishment of a multilateral 
arrangement or organization is deemed prudent or unavoidable, this is done 
in the most ambiguous and flexible terms possible. 
In the event of developing countries succeeding in transforming these 
arrangements in their own interest, advanced countries resort to their second 
strategy – that is, withdrawal from the arrangement, and then, pursuant to 
this, the creation by those powerful states of new arrangements. The 
transformation of the GATT into the WTO (World Trade Organization) may 
be seen through the prism of these two great power strategies.16 Worried that 
the GATT would not respond to their needs, the USA and the European 
Union pioneered the establishment of the WTO and invited developing states 
into the fold of this newly established organization, which, in essence, 
replaced and co-opted the GATT. 
Nevertheless, this pattern may not be always so clear-cut. For instance, 
the preference for international commercial and investment relations to be 
based on bilateral treaties is rooted in historical context. At first, the United 
States – the advanced country par excellence – promoted a multilateral 
investment treaty under the auspices of the OECD in 1995 but upon failure 
to materialize, the United States initiated a policy of bilateral investment 
treaties, which contributed to the growing trend of bilateral investment 
treaties that took place between 1990 and 2015. 
                                                 
16  Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, p.616.  
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This fragmentation of international law pushes the limits of formal 
international law and leads to confusion. An informal perspective on 
international law is thus in order. Indeed, international arbitration operates 
on the whole on an informal basis. The next section expounds upon this 
informality. 
3. INFORMAL INTERNATIONAL LAW MAKING 
There are some corollaries to the fragmentation of international law: 
avoiding definite and binding engagements as much as possible, concluding 
treaties in ambiguous terms, participating in the preparatory work of 
international treaties without signing up to them (e.g., the lack of American, 
Russian and Chinese participation in the International Criminal Court), 
preferring bilateral treaties and bilateral dispute settlements over multilateral 
treaties and multilateral dispute settlements, and finally, avoiding formal 
commitments as far as possible, with a preference for voluntary participation 
in international initiatives instead. In fact, all these symptoms could be 
conceptualized under the rubric of informal international law making.17 
Most important of all, regulating procedural aspects rather than 
substantive issues is the linchpin of informal international law making. 
Informal international law making predicates a certain method of law 
making. International treaties are not favored. If the subjects of international 
law comply with non-binding criteria, standards and concepts, then one can 
talk of the existence of informal law.18 Informal international law is 
determined merely in terms of its effect. This counters the modern – forma-
list and centralist – perception of law. Informal international law is 
idiosyncratic in that it openly admits indeterminacy in the international 
system and the impossibility of framing it in a definite structure.19 Indeed, 
informal international law does not need permanent courts for interpretation. 
At the fundamental level, informal international law is comprised of 
principles, standards and concepts. It does not seek to establish definite 
                                                 
17  Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses Wessel, Jan Wouters, Informal International Law Making, 
Oxford University Press, Great Britain, 2012.  
18  Ayelet Berman, et al, Informal International Law Making, eds., Torkel Opsal, Academic 
Epublisher, 2012. 
19  Halil Rahman Basaran, Responsibility to Protect: An Anti-fragile Perspective, Mississippi 
College Law Review, vol.32, issue 3, p.469.  
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substantive criteria, but rather a method (viz., a procedure) of law making. 
Actually, this may not be in absolute contradistinction to the basic premises 
of modern international law, in that, arguably, modern international law-
making is also procedural – that is, it is value-neutral. “Its rules are 
accessible to any country: non-interference in the domestic affairs of other 
states, the inviolability of borders, the sovereignty of states, encouragements 
of international law.”20 There is a “neutral” process of formation of modern 
international law, which started with the Peace of Westphalia in the 
European continent in the 17th century. Indeed, Henry Kissinger argues thus 
in respect of the Peace of Westphalia and the emerging international law:21 
“The genius of this system, and the reason it spread across the world, 
was that its provisions were procedural, not substantive. If a state would 
accept these basic requirements, it could be recognized as an international 
citizen able to maintain its own culture, politics, religion and internal 
policies, shielded by the international system from outside intervention… 
The Westphalian concept took multiplicity as its starting point and drew a 
variety of multiple societies, each accepted as a reality, into a common 
search for order. By the mid-twentieth century, this international system was 
in place on every continent; it remains the scaffolding of international order 
such as it now exists.” 
In the 21st century, what is being witnessed is an even greater emphasis 
upon the procedure of law-making. In other words, the procedural basis of 
law-making has been favored over substantive law-making, a procedure that 
has become more and more informal. Principles and standards are not 
determined by heads of state, prime ministers, foreign ministers, ambassadors 
or diplomats in a formal and predetermined procedure, but by central bank 
officials, representatives of competition authorities, functionaries of 
environmental protection agencies, renowned international lawyers, 
arbitrators and other experts in informal and semi-transparent gatherings. 
Rather than the highest echelons of the state, it is middle- and/or low-ranking 
officials, bureaucrats and experts that form (informal) international law. 
Rather than being deemed a radical break with international law, 
informal international law-making, in its emphasis upon procedure, should 
                                                 
20  Henry A. Kissinger, World Order – Reflections on the Character of Nations and Course 
of History, Allen Lane, Penguin Books, USA, UK, 2014, p.363.  
21  Ibid., p.27. 
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be seen as reflecting the evolution of international law. Substantive 
international law exists to the extent that it is adhered to. There exists a 
procedure to constructing international law that has the function of 
supporting the classical sources of international law as indicated in Article 
38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.22 
In informal international law-making, national bureaucracies should 
avoid international treaties and formal obligations as much as possible and 
opt instead to simply delineate principles and standards. If the upholding of a 
legal obligation becomes unavoidable, then it should, at least, be delineated 
in general terms. If disputes arise, it is neither the permanent courts nor the 
diplomats that should solve the problem, but experts. For each new dispute, 
recourse to an expert – e.g., an arbitrator – should be made and there should 
be no effect of a binding precedent with regard to these expert opinions. In 
this respect, international arbitral awards are to be considered an addition 
and a complement to classical sources of international law. 
Informal international law should not be confused with customary 
international law. Compliance with informal international law does not 
necessarily imply a presumption or belief (opinio iuris) that a customary rule 
of international law (a classic source of international law) exists. Compliance 
does not stem from the existence of a legal obligation, but occurs as a result 
of self-interest. Informal international law is thus, basically, a strategy (a 
procedure) of law making (and can only be an indirect source of 
international law) whereas customary international law is clearly indicated as 
a direct source of international law in Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice. International arbitral tribunals can adjudicate 
cases solely based on customary rules, whereas they cannot decide disputes 
solely on the basis of a purported informal law.23 
                                                 
22  Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38: 1. The Court, whose function is to 
decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall 
apply: a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the contesting states; b. international custom, as evidence of a 
general practice accepted as law; c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations; d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of 
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law. 2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court 
to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto. 
23  Carl Baudenbacher, Foreword: Globalization of the Judiciary, Texas International Law 
Journal, vol.38, 2003, p.400: For instance, those ad hoc arbitral tribunals established 
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International arbitration could be seen as a system of legitimacy that 
facilitates decisions and moderates policies24 as well as a facilitator of 
government-to-government, government-to-business and business-to-
business relations. In fact, there are parallels between the modern formation 
of public international law and the emergence of international arbitration. 
For instance, before World War I, during the emergence of modern 
international law, many arbitration treaties had been concluded, although 
there is no record to suggest or verify that any such treaty was ever applied 
to a concrete issue.25 Nevertheless, after World War I, the newly established 
League of Nations supported the resolution of disputes through arbitration.26 
The 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact provided for peaceful settlement of “all 
disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, 
which may arise among them.”27 Yet, this initiative also failed, as evidenced 
by the outbreak of World War II. 
The fragmentary nature of international law and the informal nature of 
international law-making may be seen as the consequence of the 
manipulation of the system on the part of advanced countries, while at the 
same time they may also be interpreted as the natural reaction of 
international law to the international political and economic system. No 
central legislature formulates and creates international law and no strict 
hierarchy exists among the sources – treaties, custom and general legal 
principles – of international law. In this regard, international law is a 
constantly evolving process that incorporates new sources, methods and 
actors into its fold. Indeed, new actors, such as corporations, private 
                                                                                                                   
under section 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) regard 
customary international law as a binding source of international law.  
24  Henry Kissinger, p.210. (Henry Kissinger makes this statement with regard to the balance 
of power.)  
25  Ibid., p.258. 
26  Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 12: The Members of the League agree that, if 
there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture they will submit 
the matter either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to enquiry by the Council, and they 
agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the 
judicial decision, or the report by the Council. In any case under this Article the award of 
the arbitrators or the judicial decision shall be made within a reasonable time, and the 
report of the Council shall be made within six months after the submission of the dispute. 
Accessible at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp#art12, (accessed on 
03.03.2015)  
27  Kellogg-Briand Pact, Article II, accessible at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/ 
UNTS/LON/Volume%2094/v94.pdf, (accessed on 03.03.2015)  
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individuals and non-governmental organizations, often do emerge on the 
international legal platform and expectations vis-à-vis international law 
increase in tandem with the growing number of actors and challenges of the 
international system. International law is expected to regulate new areas of 
conflict and dissonance, hence its response through informal methodology 
and international arbitration. Yet, the complexity, dynamism and informality 
of international law and its fragmentary nature lead us to look for some rules 
which would determine the existence of international law as such and 
convey a sense of legal security. That is, notwithstanding the rationalizations 
of fragmentation and informality, “rules of recognition” of international law 
are still needed. 
4. RULES OF RECOGNITION 
Advanced countries can step out of a fragment of international law and 
enter into another fragment.28 This flexibility can only be explained by the 
absence of “rules of recognition”, in the sense in which Hart uses the term:29 
rules of recognition are secondary rules that serve to constitute and interpret 
primary rules – rules comprising rights and obligations. Rules of recognition 
determine the conditions of change and the binding’ quality of primary rules. 
One can talk of a consistent interpretation and implementation of law and 
impartial settlement of disputes to the extent that there are definite and clear 
rules of recognition. Rules of recognition prevent – or at least makes difficult 
– an actor or body leaving one fragment of international law for another; 
leaving a fragment of international law possessing a strong set of secondary 
rules would be costly for countries in terms of prestige and standing in the 
international system. 
Yet, international arbitration does not comprise well-established rules of 
recognition. There is no centralized systematic body of rules delineating the 
formation, interpretation and transformation of international arbitral rules. 
Although there are various rules and principles as issued by arbitral 
institutions (e.g., the International Chamber of Commerce, the International 
Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes, the American Arbitration 
Association and the London Court of International Arbitration), or other 
                                                 
28  Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, p.623.  
29  H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York, 1997.  
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bodies (e.g., the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law), 
they are not universally compulsory or binding. Every arbitral institution 
exercises its jurisdiction upon those who accept them, and these ‘internal’ 
rules and principles, arguably, do not have the effect of the force of a 
binding customary rule. 
Besides, there is no rule of binding precedent in international 
arbitration.30 Arbitrators cannot be supervised as regards their diverging 
evaluations of the merits of the cases before them and their substantive 
choices. The supervision on the part of international arbitral institutions 
(such as the International Chamber of Commerce or the International Center 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes) takes place in procedural terms – no 
substantive control is executed. Every arbitral tribunal is established for a 
temporary period and for a specific dispute’s settlement, at the expense of 
continuity. The making, interpretating and modifying of international 
arbitration law (secondary rules of international arbitration law) are not 
under a central and all-encompassing institution; there is no central appellate 
court of international arbitration. 
Moreover, the prospect of this situation changing in the immediate future 
would seem remote. On the one hand, advanced countries and multinational 
corporations seem content with the current state of international arbitration, 
whilst on the other, developing countries, often in dire need of investment and 
trade, wish to avoid a scenario whereby advanced countries exit the legal 
fold. That is, they wish to avoid the destiny of the League of Nations and the 
GATT, in which the lack of participation (or the threat of withdrawal thereof) 
by powerful states rendered the institutions ineffective. 
In this respect, an interesting initiative designed to integrate the 
international arbitration “fragment” into general international law and to 
strengthen its rules of recognition was aborted. The International Law 
Commission, in its first draft on the responsibility of states for 
internationally wrongful acts, provided for the supervision of international 
arbitral awards by the International Court of Justice (ICJ).31 Many states 
                                                 
30  ICSID decision, no. ARB 02/17, AES Corp v. Argentine Republic (Jurisdiction), para.30: 
“Each Tribunal is sovereign, and may retain ... a different solution for resolving the same 
problem.”  
31  Article 60(1) of the first Draft on the Responsibility of States for their Internationally 
Wrongful Acts provided as follows: “If the validity of an arbitral award is challenged by 
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reacted negatively to this provision; they claimed that such provision was not 
compatible with customary international law. Arguably, an instrument 
dealing with the responsibility of states should not contain such a detailed 
provision on international dispute settlement. Most importantly, the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ over the validity of arbitral awards was 
deemed exorbitant.32 
In fact, rather than forming an international treaty, the optimum way to 
present the ICJ as the supervisory court over all international dispute 
settlement – including international arbitration – would be through the ICJ’s 
own effort at interpreting concrete cases in the light of general international 
law as much as possible.33 In other words, the ICJ, through its jurisprudence, 
might progressively strive to expand its authority over other methods of 
adjudication, including international arbitration. The ICJ would also consider 
the totality of international law and perhaps not limit its decisions to the 
narrow parameters of the concrete disputes.34 For this, the ICJ should invoke 
some superior values, as such that would help constitute rules of recognition 
of international arbitration. 
These superior values could be recapitulated under the rubric of 
international public policy. Indeed, some doctrines argue that international 
arbitration should comply with certain international public policies.35 This 
assertion is in line with the perspective that considers international 
arbitration an integral part of international law. There are, indeed, some 
values of the international order that may be considered ultimate, and 
international law exists and legitimizes itself thanks to and through these 
values. International dispute settlement should also respect these values. 
Indeed, the ICJ could invoke these values to counter the fragmentary nature 
of international law. 
                                                                                                                   
either party to the dispute, and within three months of the date of the challenge the parties 
have not agreed on another tribunal, the International Court of Justice should be 
competent, upon the timely request of any party, to confirm the validity of the award, or 
declare its total or partial nullity.” 
32  James D. Fry, “Desordre” Public International under the New York Convention: Wither 
Truly International Public Policy, Chinese Journal of International Law, vol.8, no.1, 
2009, p.113.  
33  Benedict Kingsbury, Foreword: Is the Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals 
a systemic failure?, 31 NYU Journal of International Law & Politics, p.693.  
34  Ibid.  
35  James D. Fry, p.116.  
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The number of international courts and tribunals is constantly increasing. 
This is a source of mischief in that each court, without coordination 
whatsoever, might interpret rules of recognition of international law 
differently. There exists no hierarchy among these courts, nor does any 
obligation exist for one court to refer to the jurisprudence of another court. 
There is no system of international courts, but a plethora of courts, with each 
acting on a self-sustaining basis. International arbitral tribunals epitomize this 
diversity and this atomism of courts and tribunals. Indeed, envisaging a 
universal and coherent system of international courts, including international 
arbitral tribunals, poses a challenge for international law. Actually, most of 
the disputes relating to international arbitration are based upon bilateral 
relationships,36 and every bilateral relationship is deemed exclusive. Yet, the 
rules of recognition should be universal, towering over bilateral relationships, 
and a coherent set of rules of recognition needs a coherent system of 
international courts interpreting rules of recognition in a coherent way. 
An example for the weakness of rules of recognition in international 
arbitration is that the United Nations International Law Commission cannot 
proclaim and codify universal rules as regards cross-border gas and oil 
reserves.37 Such a codification would facilitate and harmonize international 
arbitral awards concerning gas and oil disputes. However, the Commission 
argued that this field is regulated by bilateral treaties and that the 
determination of the parties’ common intention is more important than 
determining some universal principles and rules in the field.38 That is to say, 
even though bilateral treaties regulating investment and trade in oil and gas 
may be similar to each other, there is no obligation to interpret them 
similarly. Actually, the fact that some terms in the bilateral investment 
treaties (e.g., “investment” and “fair and equitable treatment”) may be left 
ambiguous and do not have universal definition does not facilitate the job of 
the interpreter.39 
In short, international arbitration, as a “fragment” of international law, 
has an “informal” dimension and it is problematic in terms of “rules of 
                                                 
36  James Harrison, The International Law Commission and the Development of International 
Investment Law, 45 George Washington International Law Review, 2013, p.429.  
37  Report of the International Law Commission, 62nd session, 3 May – 4 June, 5 July – 6 
August, 2010, para.382, UN Doc. A/65/10, 65th session, no.10, 2010.  
38  James Harrison, p.429.  
39  Ibid., p.430. 
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recognition”. Taking into account these three characteristics, one has to 
question and examine the contribution of international arbitration to 
international law. 
5. THE CONTRIBUTION OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 
5.1. Enrichment of international law 
While intergovernmental arbitration, which settles pure public 
international law disputes, is a reflection of equal sovereignty, international 
commercial and investment arbitration is a reflection of the freedom of 
contract.40 The parties to the dispute come together of their own volition and 
establish the international arbitral tribunal. While intergovernmental 
arbitration is a topic of public international law, international commercial 
arbitration is a topic of procedural law or private international law, or 
contract law (as in the UK and the USA).41 
The subjects of classical international law are states and states only.42 
Yet, international arbitration ensures the participation of non-state parties 
(businesses and private individuals) in international dispute settlement, 
which enriches international law. Besides, the lack of a global investment 
organization, a global investment court or a global trade court highlights the 
importance and the necessity of international commercial and investment 
arbitration. It fills an institutional gap in international law. 
Enrichment of international law through arbitration also takes place in 
terms of substantive law. In this respect, the principles of “fair and equitable 
treatment” and “obligation of the host state to comply with legal 
obligations”, principles that protect foreign investors, may be followed.43 
                                                 
40  Joshua Taylor, International Maritime Arbitration and the Rotterdam Rules: A New 
Perspective on Party Autonomy, 28 ANZ Mar LJ, 2014, p.27.  
41  Stavros L. Brekoulakis, International Arbitration Scholarship and the Concept of 
Arbitration Law, 36 Fordham International Law Journal, 2013, p.764.  
42  Permanent Court of International Justice, Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Ser.A, 
no.5, 1925.  
43  L. Yves Fortier, Investment Protection and the Rule of Law: Change or Decline?, The 
British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 50th Anniversary Event Series, 17 
March 2009, p.15.  
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The interpretation of these principles, however, is not to be left to national 
jurisdictions, but is a matter for international law – thanks also to 
international arbitration. 
In effect, most of the principles and concepts invoked in international 
investment law are the corollary of one of the most sensitive topics of 
international law – that is, the treatment of aliens. Aliens might invoke the 
lack of a reliable and neutral judicial authority that is able to fairly judge 
their treatment by the host state. The fact that the investor cannot ensure his 
right through a judicial mechanism is labeled “denial of justice” in 
international law.44 International arbitral tribunals highlight denial of justice 
as regards the obligation of national legal authorities to act in common sense 
and justice, and the concomitant lack thereof as an indication of bad faith.45 
Denial of justice is an issue of human rights.46 It is about the right to 
access to justice – in other words, the right to be heard by a judicial 
authority.47 This concept epitomizes the intertwining of international 
arbitration with both international law and national laws. Indeed, the French 
Court of Appeal, in the context of an arbitration between Israel and Iran (and 
their corporations), made it clear that the right of access to a judge – 
including an arbitrator – is inherent in the international order and is endorsed 
by the European Convention on Human Rights.48 Specifically, in this case, 
the French Court of Appeal held that the rights of the National Iranian Oil 
Company (NIOC) had been violated, as it could not resort to courts in Iran49 
or Israel50 due to the enmity51 between the two countries.52 
                                                 
44  Mr. Franck Charles Arif v. Republic of Moldova, ICSID Case no. ARB/11/23, 2013, 
para.345: “..., there is no general requirement to exhaust local remedies for a treaty claim 
to exist, unless such a claim is for denial of justice. In a claim for denial of justice, the 
conduct of the whole judicial system is relevant.”  
45  Ibid. para.482: “The Tribunal’s role is limited to determine whether the judiciary has denied 
justice by applying procedures that are so void of reason that they breathe bad faith...” 
46  Francesco Francioni, Access to Justice as a Human Right, Oxford University Press, New 
York, 2007.  
47  Ibid., p.3.  
48  NIOC (National Iranian Oil Company) v. Israel case, French Regional Court of Appeal 
(Cour d’Appel), Paris, March 29, 2001.  
49  Due to enmity between Iran and Israel and the current attitude of the Israeli courts in 
designating Iran as an “enemy state”, it is not plausible that an Iranian court decision 
would be recognized and enforced by Israeli courts.  
50  The NIOC tried to sue the Israeli government in an Israeli court. However, the court 
rejected the suit, ruling that Iran had been ruled an enemy state and thus had no 
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The NIOC initiated an arbitration process against Israel based on the 
agreements made between Israel and Iran and their respective companies. The 
agreements, which were entered into before the 1979 Islamic Revolution in 
Iran and when the two countries were on amicable terms, detailed the 
provision of Iranian crude oil to Israel. Indeed, the NIOC supplied oil to 
Israel via three Israeli companies based in Israel and a shell company based in 
Switzerland. In effect, the Swiss shell company was conducting operations on 
behalf of the three Israeli companies. Yet, the outstanding debt owed to Iran 
due to this oil transaction was not paid by Israel after the 1979 Revolution in 
Iran and the ensuing dispute was centered around the payment of this debt. 
In this context, the Israeli refusal to appoint an arbitrator, together with 
the impossibility of the NIOC to resort to Israeli or Iranian national legal 
systems for a remedy, was seen by the French court as an embodiment of the 
case of “denial of justice”. To prevent this denial of justice, the French court 
appointed an arbitrator on behalf of Israel and helped establish the arbitral 
tribunal. This took place notwithstanding the fact that this arbitration had a 
tenuous link with France – a clause in the arbitration agreement which 
granted the president of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) the 
authority to appoint a presiding arbitrator in the event that arbitrators 
appointed by the two parties did not reach a settlement in their dispute. The 
French Court of Appeals held that if the International Chamber of 
Commerce (based in Paris) is in possession of such competence, then the 
French national courts also possess the jurisdiction to nominate an arbitrator. 
Likewise, the arbitral tribunal, seated in Geneva,53 Switzerland, and 
created thanks to the support of the French Court of Appeal, confirmed its 
                                                                                                                   
standing within the Israeli legal system. See, Haaretz newspaper, Aluff Benn, Israel 
holding over $250m it owes Iran for oil in secret account, 20.02.2015. Accessible at 
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.643394, (accessed on 
03.03.2015)  
51  In the Manbar case, in June 1988, the Tel Aviv Disctrict Court declared Iran an enemy of 
the State of Israel. Lindsay Chichester, National Iranian Oil Co. v. Israel: France 
Reinterprets Its code to Prevent “Denial of Justice”, Leaving Israel Between Iran and a 
Hard Place, Tulane Journal of International & Comparative Law, vol.11, 2003, p.384. Gil 
Hoffman, Court Rejects Manbar’s Appeal for Treason, Jerusalem Post, Dec.6, 2000, p.3.  
52  Haaretz newspaper, Aluff Benn, Israel holding over $250m it owes Iran for oil in secret 
account. February 20, 2015.  
53  On July 19, 2004, the two arbitrators determined the seat of the arbitral tribunal to be in 
Geneva. Hansjörg Stutzer, National Iranian Oil Company v. the State of Israel... a never 
ending story?, Arbitration Newsletter Switzerland, February 22, 2013, p.2.  
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own jurisdiction in the dispute.54 The Tribunal argued that an agreement to 
arbitrate entails the obligation to nominate an arbitrator. Failure to do so 
implies the other party is justified in applying to a competent state court to 
request the appointment of an arbitrator –the French court, in this particular 
concrete case. “Without court intervention, a party’s denial of an agreement 
or default on an award could go unrecognized and unresolved.”55 
Israel filed an action against this arbitral partial award on jurisdiction 
before the Swiss Federal Supreme Court to have the partial award set aside. 
The Federal Supreme Court rejected the appeal and did not set aside the 
arbitral partial award on jurisdiction.56 That is, the Swiss Federal Supreme 
Court confirmed both the French Court of Appeal’s and the Geneva-based 
arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction.57 Both the French and the Swiss national 
courts – through their rulings – compelled the two parties to undergo 
arbitration. In this regard, both the French and the Swiss national court 
pursued an international public policy – namely, the prevention of denial of 
justice, an act which in itself marks a contribution to the corpus of 
international law. 
5.2. Binding Precedent 
Nonetheless, the lack of binding precedent may question the 
contribution international arbitration has made to international law. That is, 
to what extent are international arbitral awards compatible with each other? 
For instance, the interpretation of the concept of “fair and equitable 
treatment” by one arbitral tribunal does not bind any other arbitral tribunal 
and differences may arise between arbitral awards, which questions the 
contribution made by international arbitration in terms of substantive law. 
Two responses may be posited to this problematic. 
First, it is a fact that even in national legal systems, there may be 
incompatibility between court decisions. Discrepancies between the 
                                                 
54  Ibid., p.2. 
55  Lindsay Chichester, p.386.  
56  Swiss Federal Supreme Court, Decision no. 4A_146/2012, 10 January 2013.  
57  Ibid. See Matthias Scherer & Domitille Baizeau, Swiss Federal Supreme Court confirms 
NIOC vs. Israel award – No review of French court decision to appoint arbitrator in 
order to avoid international denial of justice, ASA Bulletin, vol.31, issue 2, p.400-403.  
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decisions of national judges may arise and different chambers of a national 
supreme court may hand down divergent opinions/rulings. In other words, 
national courts and their chambers should not be seen as working either in 
complete harmony or with complete correspondence. A space for dissension 
and divergence can be said to exist. 
Second, general international law does not have a rule of binding 
precedent. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), the “World Court”, is the 
epitome thereof. Under Article 59 of the Statute of the ICJ, it is clearly stated 
that ICJ decisions are binding only on the parties to the dispute,58 making 
every award, in essence, self-contained. Hence, the ICJ can, in its later 
rulings, deviate from its previous rulings. A regard for consistency seems 
either notably lacking or absent. 
However, two counter-arguments can be said to exist: first, the national 
legislature and the national judiciary do possess a safety valve with regard to 
discrepancies and inconsistencies in national laws: a new law is either 
promulgated and the issue thus definitely resolved through the legislative 
intervention, or the national supreme court hands down a binding decision 
given by joint chambers and thereby eliminates the inconsistency. 
The second counter-argument is linked to general international law. It is 
a truism that in international law, one cannot speak of binding precedent, both 
related and due to the fact that there is no world court with powers to compel. 
States themselves decide to resort to the ICJ, and recourse to the ICJ is based 
on the consent of states. This discretionary element in terms of recourse to the 
court implies a certain elasticity within the international community of states: 
the dispute between two states is singular and distinct and cannot be decided 
by judgements issued over previous disputes between other states. Every 
dispute is therefore different – that is, sui generis – with its own particular 
context and its own specific conditions, which in turn encourages states to 
apply to the court. This creates an expectation that the dispute will be treated 
as a singular case and that sovereignty will be respected and not be 
constrained or infringed upon by the accumulation of previous ICJ awards. 
Nevertheless, although there is no formal binding precedent rule, the 
ICJ imparts a message that it acts consistently. That is, the ICJ refers to its 
                                                 
58  Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 59: The decision of the Court has no 
binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case. 
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previous decisions regularly, which is also true of international arbitral 
tribunals. Indeed, an ICSID arbitral tribunal stated, in the Bayındır v. Pakis-
tan ruling,59 that: 
“The Tribunal is not bound by previous decisions of ICSID Tribunals. 
At the same time, it is of the opinion that it should pay due regard to earlier 
decisions of such tribunals. The Tribunal is further of the view that, unless 
there are compelling reasons to the contrary, it ought to follow decisions 
established in a series of consistent cases, comparable to the case at hand, 
but subject of course to the specifics of given treaty and of the circumstances 
of the actual case. By doing so, it will meet its duty to seek to contribute to 
the harmonious development of investment law and thereby to meet the 
legitimate expectations of the community of states and investors towards 
certainty of the rule of law.” 
A similar statement exists in another ICSID arbitration award, Saipem 
Spa v Bangladesh:60 
“(Arbitrators) have a duty to adopt solutions established in a consistent 
series of cases … (and) a duty to seek to contribute to the harmonious 
development of investment law and thereby to meet the legitimate 
expectations of the community of States and investors towards the certainty 
of the rule of law.” 
Such statements enhance the prestige and the reliability of international 
arbitration.61 Indeed, ICSID arbitral awards share commonalities in terms of 
reasoning, interpretation and language.62 A contradictory situation of sorts 
therefore exists: while there is no formal binding precedent rule, courts and 
tribunals strive to give the impression of consistency. This is a trait of 
informal international law and may be labeled de facto binding precedent (or 
de facto stare decisis).63 
                                                 
59  Bayındır Insaat Turizm Ticaret Sanayi Anonim Sirketi v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 
ICSID Case no. ARB/03/29, para.145.  
60  Saipem SpA v. Bangladesh (Jurisdiction), ICSID case no. ARB/05/07, para.67. 
61  Christoph Schreuer, Diversity and Harmonization of Treaty Interpretation in Investment 
Arbitration, 3 Transnational Dispute Management 1, April 2006, p.17: “Fortunately, the 
problem of inconsistency is not pervasive. Most tribunals carefully examine earlier 
decisions and accept these as authority most of the time.”  
62  Campbell Mclachlan QC, p.378-379. 
63  Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity or Excuse?, The 2006 
Freshfields Lecture, p.363.  
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5.3. Autonomy of international arbitration 
Another similarity between international arbitration and general 
international law is that one cannot invoke internal law. Classic international 
law provides for ‘non-invocability’ of internal law vis-à-vis international law 
in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 46.64 This is 
important for the stability of international relations and for international 
law’s autonomy from national laws, two qualities that are also assets in 
international arbitration. For instance, the International Chamber of 
Commerce’s International Arbitration Court arbitral award no.1939 (1973) 
stated that the state, which consented to arbitration in writing, cannot 
withdraw this consent at a later date.65 The impossibility of unilaterally 
cancelling an arbitration agreement by invoking internal law is evidence of 
the fact that international arbitration law is self-sustaining and autonomous.66 
Indeed, acting in accordance with previous commitments – estoppel – is a 
principle of general international law that may also be conceived of as part 
of the international public order or of international public policy that may, in 
international arbitral awards, be taken into consideration. 
Therefore, it would be implausible to argue that international 
arbitration is isolated from general international law. Granted, not only are 
international arbitral tribunals many in number and somewhat dispersed, 
there is also a variety in the procedural and substantive laws applied by 
these arbitral tribunals. Yet, this does not mean that international arbitration 
is an arbitrary mechanism. On the contrary, international arbitration is 
wholly compatible with the structure and the functioning of general 
international law. International arbitration is evidence of the fact that 
international law should, in fact, be conceived of as a network of norms and 
                                                 
64  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 46, accessible at https://treaties.un.org/ 
doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201155/volume-1155-I-18232-English.pdf, (accessed on 
03.03.2015)  
65  ICC decision no. 1939 (1973), para.145. Jan Paulsson, May a State invoke its internal law 
to repudiate consent to international commercial arbitration?, Arbitration International, 
1986, p.1: “... international ordre public would vigorously reject the proposition that a 
State organ, dealing with foreigners, having openly, with knowledge and intent, 
concluded an arbitration clause that inspires the concontractant’s confidence, could 
thereafter, whether, in the arbitration, or in execution proceedings, invoke the nullity of its 
own promise.”  
66  Benteler v. Belgium, Preliminary Arbitral Award, Journal des Tribunaux (Bruxelles), 
no.5289, 31 March 1984, European Commercial Cases, 101.  
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institutions.67 In this context, on the one hand, international arbitration is 
autonomous from national laws and general international law whilst also, on 
the other hand, being quite compatible with both. 
In principle, international arbitration regards every dispute as self-
contained, with every arbitral decision different and specific. Arbitrators thus 
have a broad space in which to maneuver. Even though the same law might 
be selected as the law to be applied to the dispute at hand, its application in 
one particular case may be different from that of a previous arbitral decision. 
There is no appellate court eliminating this difference in application in 
substantive terms. With this in mind, international arbitration may be 
deemed a method, rather than a substantive corpus of law.68 
International commercial arbitration does not seek to establish a 
consistent and systematic legal system, but to respond to the practical and 
concrete needs of international trade in a speedy and effective way. This is in 
line with the current dominant view of international law. That is, 
notwithstanding the current problems and dysfunctions in international law, 
both theory and practice continue to shape international law. “The resilience 
of international law has been greater than expected because in international 
law, practice continues to shape theory, and deeply embedded theory 
continues to shore up practice.”69 
In a way, arbitrators become creators of law. On the one hand, the 
principle of confidentiality inherent in international commercial arbitration 
(e.g., in the International Chamber of Commerce arbitration) and in public 
international law arbitration (e.g. the Permanent Court of Arbitration) prevents 
the systematic consideration and interpretation of arbitral awards with regard 
to merits. Yet, on the other hand, many arbitral awards cite previous arbitral 
awards.70 There is, though implicit, a concern for consistency71 and this 
                                                 
67  Emmanuel Gaillard, (in French), Aspects Philosophiques du Droit de L’Arbitrage 
International, Les Livres de Poche de L’Academie de Droit International de La Haye, 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2008, p.18.  
68  Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, p.364. 
69  Benedict Kingsbury, The International Legal Order, International Law and Justice 
Working Papers, 2003/1, New York University School of Law, p.2.  
70  Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, p.362-63 
71  El Paso Energy International Co. V. Argentine Republic, ICSID case ARB/03/15, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, 27 April 2006, para.39.  
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consistency could be interpreted as a search for autonomy in and by 
international arbitration. 
In particular, in international investment law, there are two more 
mechanisms that provide for a degree of consistency and coherence. First, 
arbitral tribunals consider the wording of other international investment 
treaties and the disputes resolved by other arbitral tribunals in the light of 
these treaties – a form of cross-treaty interpretation. The second mechanism 
is based upon the “most-favoured nation clause”, which is placed in most 
bilateral investment treaties.72 This clause ensures similar levels of 
protection for investors. These two mechanisms are important elements in 
securing a “de facto binding precedent rule” in international arbitration. 
Notwithstanding the fragmentary nature of international investment law, 
which is due to the existence of hundreds of bilateral investment protection 
and promotion treaties, these two mechanisms arguably ensure the presence 
of an autonomous and relatively homogenous international investment law. 
The existence of the fragmentary nature together with these two mechanisms 
and the frequent citation of previous arbitral awards by the subsequent ones 
prevent us from acquiring a clearer picture of international investment 
arbitration. Actually, this is similar to general international law, in which 
contradiction and incompleteness on the one hand and centralization efforts 
on the other are congenital qualities. 
This situation is evidence that neither general international law nor 
international arbitration are fully fledged and complete systems. 
Incomplete legal systems do not possess a central organizing authority. In 
such systems, it is all the more natural to see a dispersed dispute settlement 
mechanism.73 Every dispute is deemed clearly and singularly different, and 
concerns itself solely with the specific needs of the parties to the dispute.74 
Just as there is no centralized international legal system encompassing the 
whole world,75 there is no full-fledged and coherent international 
arbitration law. 
                                                 
72  Adrian M. Johnston & Michael J. Trebilcock, Fragmentation in international trade law: 
insights from the global investment regime, World Trade Review, 12:4, 2013, p.622. 
73  Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, p.374-375.  
74  Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Ibid., p.376. 
75  Benedict Kingsbury, Foreword: Is the Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals 
a systemic failure?, p.690.  
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In this respect, international arbitral tribunals are to be deemed second-
generation international courts.76 The first-generation courts – such as the 
International Court of Justice – do not wholly respond to the needs of the 
international community. The primary reason for this is that the enforcement 
of the judgments of these courts is too politicized, and thus problematic – 
governments may resist enforcement.77 To be sure, there are exceptionally 
successful first–generation courts in terms of the enforcement of their 
decisions, e.g., the European Court of Human Rights. Yet, in general, the 
problems as regards legal standing, general difficulty in the implementation 
of decisions and procedural deficiencies (e.g., the interrogation of witnesses 
is exceptionally rare, even though it may prove beneficial, problems with 
disclosing evidence, the passive and deferential attitude of courts vis-à-vis 
the claimants and defendants78) led to the decrease in popularity of first-
generation courts. International arbitration seems to suffer less from these 
problems. 
Importantly, the recognition and the enforcement of arbitral awards are 
less politicized. Arbitration is, arguably, more technical and neutral. In this 
regard, in the context of the recent arbitration between Iran and Israel, it is 
interesting to note that the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, to which the Swiss 
company under Israeli control resorted for the annulment of the arbitral 
award and the refusal of its enforcement, rejected Israeli arguments as 
merely partaking of political arguments.79 The Swiss judges added that the 
Israeli arguments were concerned with the political conflict between Israel 
and Iran and not with the contractual obligations as such. Accordingly, the 
Israeli appeal was rejected. The Israeli argument that Iran was an enemy 
state to which no payment could be made and that it would otherwise be 
against the international norm of sanctioning a regime imposed upon Iran 
was found to be a political argument in violation of law. The Swiss judges 
argued that such diplomatic-political arguments were not admissible and that 
                                                 
76  Gary Born, A new generation of international adjudication, Duke Law Journal, vol.61, 
number 4, January 2012.  
77  Ibid.  
78  Ibid.  
79  Swiss Federal Supreme Court, Decision 4A_250/2013, X.....Ltd. v. Societe Z.....The 
original decision is in French. The full text is available on the website of the Federal 
Tribunal. www.bger.ch. The English translation of the decision is accessible at 
http://www.swissarbitrationdecisions.com/sites/default/files/21%20janvier%202014%204
A%20250%202013.pdf, (accessed on 12.02.2015)  
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a debt based on contractual obligations had to be paid.80 A Swiss company 
(under the control of Israel) had a debt to an Iranian company, based upon 
unpaid invoices for oil deliveries made 34 years earlier and was deemed a 
technical matter provided for in a contract. 
In another view, the Swiss legal criteria – the Swiss understanding of 
international public policy – was applied to an arbitral dispute between two 
disputing countries and their corporations. The fulfillment of contractual 
obligations was favored by the Swiss judges as a form of international public 
policy. Granted, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court conditioned the transfer 
of the money from Switzerland to the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) 
on the approval of the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, and thus 
granted the Israelis an opportunity to avoid payment of the debt.81 This may 
be viewed as concession/admission of sorts on the part of the Federal Court 
that the international sanctions regime, with which the Swiss governments 
complies, may clash with the arbitral award. Nevertheless, and significantly, 
an arbitral tribunal was duly established and the arbitration process 
culminated in an award with a view to contractual obligations, which was 
confirmed by the Swiss national courts. The political decision with respect to 
the international sanctions regime was left to the political organs – that is, 
the Swiss government. Neither the arbitral tribunal seated in Geneva nor the 
Swiss Federal Supreme Court became embroiled in the political and 
diplomatic dimensions of the dispute. The arbitration process did not 
consider the sanctions regime as a valid platform that could prevent the 
arbitral tribunal and the Swiss Federal Supreme Court from finding Israel 
liable to pay its contractual debts to Iran. As such, international arbitration is 
autonomous and thus contributes to international law. 
                                                 
80  Swiss Federal Supreme Court, Decision 4A_250/2013, X.....Ltd. v. Societe Z...., para.3.2: 
“The argument does not appear to have been submitted to the lower court and moreover, it 
does not appear admissible as presented because of its lack of reasons. Based indeed on 
some abstract considerations concerning international policy and, in particular the conflict 
existing between the state of Israel and the Islamic Republic of Iran, the argument merely 
contains some general statements as to the reach of international law over domestic law 
and does not enable the court to understand why setting aside the objection raised by a 
Swiss company (the Appellant) to an order of payment concerning the amount awarded to 
an Iranian company (the Respondent) pursuant to an enforceable arbitral award would be 
incompatible with Swiss public policy when the latter sought payment by its contractual 
counterpart of unpaid invoices concerning shipments of oil delivered 34 years earlier.”  
81  Haaretz newspaper, Aluff Benn, Israel holding over $250m it owes Iran for oil in secret 
account, 20.12.2015.  
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Still, to counter any eventual disorder or unchecked autonomy in 
international arbitration, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) could be 
provided with appellate court status above international arbitration.82 Rather 
than leaving the evaluation of “international public policy” to national 
courts, the ICJ can pursue international public policy, and a chamber of the 
ICJ could be allocated for this appellate function. This scenario would, in 
particular, be suitable to public international law arbitration and international 
investment arbitration. For international commercial arbitration, a specific 
international commercial appellate court could be established. These 
appellate courts and chambers could check arbitral awards in both procedure 
and merits, rectify legal mistakes and harmonize legal interpretations. 
But, rather than merely speculating about an eventual institutional re-
form encompassing international arbitration, parallels between international 
law and international arbitration could be better conceptualized and 
contextualized until such reform. This would be possible by looking at 
principles inherent to both. 
6. GENERAL PRİNCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND LEX MERCATORIA OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE 
Legal systems contain rules and exceptions. Yet, mechanical and 
definite rules and exceptions may not be sufficient for resolving disputes. 
Rules and exceptions may need flexible interpretation, hence the need for 
general principles. This need is most apparent on the global scale, where 
actors and disputes are numerous and diverse. Indeed, general principles of 
law support and help interpret international treaties and customary 
international law. The necessity of general principles is also highlighted by 
its firm placement in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, in which the general principles of law are viewed as one of the three 
primary sources of international law. 
In this respect, international commercial law is similar to public 
international law. International commercial transactions cannot be 
completely regulated through treaties, international commercial contracts or 
                                                 
82  Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing 
Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 Fordham Law Review, 
p.1609.  
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national laws; rather, general principles are needed. More precisely, 
merchants play a leading role in the formation of general principles of 
commerce – lex mercatoria – through their practices and customs. These 
principles are not determined by – nor are they necessarily linked to – 
national laws but are formulated and determined by businesses and 
merchants without recourse to governments. Put another way, commercial 
principles are not created by actors within the domain of public law persons, 
but by persons within the domain of private law. 
The fact that private international law (conflict of laws) does not 
respond to the many intricacies of international trade leads merchants and 
businesses to resort to lex mercatoria. Private international law is a national 
branch of law; every state has its own “special” private international law. 
However, it can arguably be stated that the “national” system of private 
international law is in crisis.83 National dispute settlement methods favor 
domestic actors, and national commercial law, national contract law and 
private international law are too intertwined to be considered neutral from 
the perspective of those businesses and merchants that engage in cross-
border trade and transactions.84 This inconvenience was first noted in the 
1960s.85 Arguably, national judges, who adjudicate upon international 
disputes through the methodology and prism of conflict of laws, tend to liken 
international disputes to national disputes. Yet, from the perspective of the 
international commercial and investment community, this produces 
unexpected and unwanted results.86 
Another problem with regard to the national rules of conflict is that the 
national judge, who decides to apply foreign national law to the dispute at 
hand, is to adjudicate as if he were the national judge of that foreign law 
system. This is most certainly a challenge and in practice causes many 
ambiguities. A national judge who does not have full knowledge of the 
external national law’s sources, methods of interpretation and functioning – 
which is a wholly plausible scenario – would not be seen as a reliable 
authority in the eyes of businesses, merchants or the international community. 
                                                 
83  Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arguments in Favor of the Triumph of Arbitration, Cardozo 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol.10, 2009, p.404.  
84  Alec Stone Sweet, The New Lex Mercatoria and Transnational Governance, Journal of 
European Public Policy, 13:5, August 2006, p.632.  
85  Ibid.  
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In this respect, the idea of an extra-national law of contract emerged. 
The principles formulated by UNIDROIT (the International Institute for the 
Unification of Private Law) for international commercial contracts epitomize 
this idea,87 in that they aim to bring about a universal contract law. A similar 
effort to unify and harmonize contract law can also be seen on the European 
continent.88 These efforts, behind which lie the common sense practices of 
international business and traders, should be considered in the framework of 
lex mercatoria. 
Lex mercatoria is in constant evolution and open to interpretation, a 
flexibility that is viewed favorably by the actors of international commerce. 
Arguably, a rigid and well-structured lex mercatoria would be similar to 
national commercial laws and constrain international businesses’ freedom of 
maneuver.89 Moreover, this degree of ambiguity in the development of lex 
mercatoria is, indeed, what makes international commercial arbitration all 
the more necessary. 
The formation of lex mercatoria is linked with the common sense and 
the policies pursued by the main actors of international trade – merchants, 
businesses and governments. On the one hand, with the decolonization of the 
1960s and 1970s, many newly independent governments were keen to reject 
the commercial codes and practices of the powerful northern (and western) 
countries when dealing with their own transnational disputes. On the other 
hand, investing corporations did not wish to submit to the domestic law of 
host countries,90 the worry being that the laws of the host state would 
inevitably favor the host state’s interests and its corporations. 
In that regard, lex mercatoria plays an important role by 
“denationalizing” some concepts and values. For instance, the principle of 
good faith – a principle of lex mercatoria – has played an important role in 
the interpretation of international commercial contracts without being 
                                                 
87  UNIDROIT principles for international commercial contracts, accessible at 
http://www.unidroit.org/publications/513-unidroit-principles-of-international-commercial-
contracts, (accessed on 03.03.2015)  
88  Lando Commission on European Contract Law, accessible at https://www.law.kuleuven. 
be/personal/mstorme/CECL.html, (accessed on 16.01.2015) 
89  Nikitas E. Hatzimihail, The Many Lives – and Faces – of Lex Mercatoria: History as 
Genealogy, in International Business Law, Law and Contemporary Problems, vol.71, 
no.3, summer 2008, p.181.  
90  Ibid., p.182 
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restrained by national laws. The lack of harmonization and codification of all 
dispute settlement rules and substantive trade law through a global unitary 
law led to the popularity of lex mercatoria. Lex mercatoria is a flexible 
remedy vis-à-vis the complexity of international trade. It ensures the 
sustainability of commercial relations between developed and developing 
countries. 
Nevertheless, the debate continues as to the status, scope and effect of 
lex mercatoria. In particular, positivists have three central criticisms of lex 
mercatoria.91 First, it is argued that as lex mercatoria is not based in any 
national law, it is not law, second, the content of lex mercatoria is too 
limited to qualify as law, and, third, lex mercatoria contains too many 
ambiguities and this undermines its reliability. Due to these three posited 
deficiencies, the arbitral tribunal arguably treads a fine line between 
discretion and arbitrariness in the application of lex mercatoria to a dispute. 
This may even lead to a situation whereby national laws are avoided, 
misinterpreted and/or misapplied through lex mercatoria.92 
Notwithstanding criticisms, lex mercatoria arguably has a distinct place 
in international arbitration. Many international arbitral instruments refer to 
lex mercatoria, directly or indirectly. For example, the UNCITRAL (the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law) Model Law93 and 
the ICSID (International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes) 
Convention94 invoke lex mercatoria by employing the terms “rules of law” 
and “rules of international law” respectively. 
The existence of lex mercatoria is also linked with the policy as pursued 
by international arbitration. If a dispute is brought before an international 
arbitral tribunal, a settlement is expected; the Tribunal cannot hand down a 
                                                 
91  Ahmet Cemil Yıldırım, Solid, Liquid and Gas Forms of the New Lex Mercatoria: How Do 
They Operate in Practice?, in International Commercial Arbitration and the New Lex 
Mercatoria, Ahmet Cemil Yıldırım & Serhat Eskiyörük, (ed.), XII Levha Press, Istanbul, 
May 2014, p.13.  
92  Ibid., p.13,14.  
93  UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, Article 28(1): The 
arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute in accordance with such rules of law as are 
chosen by the parties as applicable to the substance of the dispute.  
94  ICSID Convention, Article 42(1): The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with 
such rules of law as may be agreed by the parties. In the absence of such agreement, the 
Tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute (including its 
rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of interational law as may be applicable.  
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decision arguing that the law is not sufficiently developed or that there is no 
rule in the field. Non liquet, the non-existence of law for the settlement of a 
dispute, is not allowed in international arbitration. For instance, Article 42(2) 
of the ICSID Convention states that ICSID Tribunals shall not decide non 
liquet.95 Hence, lex mercatoria can prevent non liquet. In a similar vein, in 
public international law, general principles of law fill the gaps left by treaties 
and customary international law and thus counter non liquet. In the process, 
general principles of law systematize and constitutionalize public 
international law. 
Lex mercatoria shall not be reduced to mere concepts and terminology 
invoked by merchants. Lex mercatoria should be interpreted in larger terms. 
For example, it includes international commercial contracts and treaties, 
which regulate international trade. However, in public international law, it is 
a common view that treaties are outside general principles of law; they are 
two distinct sources of international law. 
“Soft law” – non-binding rules – can also be conceived of as an element 
of lex mercatoria. Actually, the boundary between general principles and 
soft law is difficult to determine. Thus, the two concepts may be employed 
interchangeably. For instance, UNIDROIT principles regulating 
international commercial contracts, Lando principles (European contract law 
principles), Trans-Lex principles, the ICC’s Incoterms, and the International 
Bar Association’s evidence rules may be typical examples of both lex 
mercatoria and soft law. 
On the one hand, lex mercatoria is not directly binding, but arbitral 
tribunals may attibute binding force to it. On the other, lex mercatoria 
cannot claim to regulate international trade and arbitration comprehensively. 
Yet, this does not mean that lex mercatoria does not constitute a legal 
system.96 Indeed, some ICC (International Chamber of Commerce) arbitral 
awards clearly state that lex mercatoria constitutes a legal order.97 This 
determination is important in that in a case whereby the parties to the dispute 
                                                 
95  ICSID Convention, Article 42(2): The Tribunal may not bring in a finding of non liquet 
on the ground of silence or obscurity of the law.  
96  Ahmet Cemil Yıldırım, p.17.  
97  ICC (International Chamber of Commerce) arbitral award, no.6500, 1992. Ercument 
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have not determined the law to be applied to the dispute, the arbitral tribunal 
is free to settle the dispute on the sole basis of lex mercatoria. One cannot 
argue that lex mercatoria does not constitute a legal order capable of solving 
the dispute. Yet, it is necessary to point out that the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ), the World Court, has never handed down a decision solely 
based on a general principle of law. General principles of law play only a 
secondary (supportive) role in the ICJ’s judgments – that is, in public 
international law. 
From the perspective of public international law, general principles of 
law need not be specified; it is assumed, as per an established understanding 
in public international law, that the treaty implicitly comprises general 
principles. A similar situation arguably exists in international commercial 
law and international investment law. In parallel to the understanding of 
general principles of law in public international law, lex mercatoria is part of 
the parties’ contract, unless indicated otherwise.98 The economic sector, in 
the domain of which international commercial contract is concluded, 
influences the implementation of the contract with its principles.99 In this 
context, lex mercatoria binds every commercial contract to the system of 
international trade and thus helps systematize (an) international trade and 
arbitration law. 
Public international law is distinct and autonomous from national laws. 
Granted, it can benefit from national rules and principles, yet public 
international law has established its autonomy thanks to its own sources – 
namely, treaties, customary international law and general principles of law. 
In particular, general principles of law provide international law with a 
certain identity, although these principles may be rooted in national laws. 
A similar situation exists with respect to the function of lex mercatoria 
in international commercial law and international commercial arbitration. 
Lex mercatoria may be inspired by national laws, but, at the end of the day, 
they constitute principles, concepts and standards that operate outside of 
national laws. Thanks to lex mercatoria, national laws are not regarded as 
the sole point of reference and normative expectations in international 
                                                 
98  Ercument Erdem, Lex Mercatoria and the Importance of Custom in International 
Commerce, p.42,43.  
99  Ibid.  
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commercial arbitration are not limited to national laws.100 Moreover, thanks 
to general principles of law, an eventual disconnect between general 
international law and international investment arbitration is eliminated.101 
Lex mercatoria is the corollary of comparative contract law.102 Through 
principles such as bona fides, pacta sund servanda and culpa in 
contrahendo, all of which are essential principles in national legal systems, 
lex mercatoria fills certain gaps in international commercial contracts. 
Although parties select a specific law to apply to the dispute, the arbitral 
tribunal may, additionally, decide to apply lex mercatoria.103 Yet, if the 
parties do not specifically require the application of lex mercatoria to the 
dispute, the arbitral tribunal is not obliged to apply lex mercatoria. Be that as 
it may, lex mercatoria empowers international arbitration. 
Finally, lex mercatoria might be helpful in overcoming the “binding 
precedent” conundrum of international commercial and investment 
arbitration. Rather than as binding adjudicatory precedents, previous arbitral 
rulings could be envisaged as embodiments of lex mercatoria and could be 
adopted by later arbitral tribunals as a source of law. Thus, an amalgam of 
sorts takes place between arbitral awards and general principles. However, in 
public international law, judicial decisions and general principles are 
regarded as separate sources, as epitomized by Article 38 of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice. 
This is all the more important especially in the light of the ICSID 
experience, where previous arbitral decisions are attributed a significant 
status, notwithstanding the lack of binding precedent rule as implied by 
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Article 53 of the ICSID Convention.104 ICSID tribunals aim to upgrade the 
status of previous ICSID rulings105 and the best conceptual framework to do 
that seems lex mercatoria. With this in mind, previous arbitral awards may 
be considered principles as determined and applied by previous arbitral 
tribunals, not as binding arbitral precedents as such. 
7. CONCLUSION 
International arbitration is a concept of international law. It endorses the 
fragmentary nature of international law and, as a reflection of informal 
international law-making, represents a challenge in terms of rules of 
recognition. Yet, none of these characteristics can be invoked to deny the 
contribution of international arbitration to international law. International 
arbitration is an institution inherent to international law, and one that both 
enhances and enriches international law. 
 
 
                                                 
104  ICSID Convention, Article 53(1): The award shall be binding on the parties and shall not 
be subject to any appeal or to any other remedy except those provided for in this 
Convention.  
105  ICSID case no. ARB/05/07, Saipem S.p.A. v. People’s Republic of Bangladesh, 
Jurisdiction and Recommendation on Provisional Measures, March 21, 2007, para.67: The 
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believes that, subject to compelling contrary grounds, it has a duty to adopt solutions 
established in a series of consistent cases. It also believes that, subject to the specifics of a 
given treaty and of the circumstances of the actual case, it has a duty to seek to contribute 
to the harmonious development of investment law and thereby to meet the legitimate 
expectations of the community of States and investors towards certainty of the rule of law.  
